ABSTRACT Recently, Ostad-Sharif et al. pointed out the susceptibility of three different authentication schemes themed for telecare medicine/medical information systems to key compromise impersonation attack (KCIA). To further address this issue, they proposed an ECC-based authentication and key generation scheme for healthcare applications. In this paper, we show that Ostad-Sharif et al.'s scheme is not only affected with key compromise impersonation attack but also suffers from a key compromise password guessing attack. Several papers have been published by the researchers by applying KCIA on existing authentication protocols. Before any further move in research in this direction, researchers must contemplate about KCIA. We conclude this article with a rigorous analysis of KCIA along with two questions to ponderon for the research community working in this field.
I. INTRODUCTION
Telecare medicine/medical information systems (TMIS) are systems dedicated to provide online healthcare services. It is playing an important role in upgrading the traditional time consuming healthcare system to a smart healthcare system with the use of information and communication technology (ICT). As these systems are entirely based on Internet, an open medium, security and privacy are major concerns for their viability. The issue of security and privacy is well addressed by the authentication and key agreement schemes.
Recently, Ostad-Sharif et al. [1] pointed out key compromise impersonation attack in authentication schemes designed by Giri et al. [2] , Amin and Biswas [3] , and Arshad and Rasoolzadegan [4] for telecare medicine/medical information systems (TMIS). In succession, Ostad-Sharif et al. [1] also proposed an authentication scheme for healthcare
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applications. In this paper, we show that their scheme is also susceptible to key compromise impersonation attack. The worst case is that in their scheme the key compromise impersonation attack leads to password guessing attack. 
II. NOTATIONS AND PICTORIAL REVIEW

A. KEY COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION ATTACK
An attacker E possessing the secret key x of the server S intercepts the login message {token [5] , [6] . Then E can guess the password of p i in any of the following ways.
E computes (id p ||n s ) = dec x (eid p ) to obtain id p , makes a guess id * m for identity of the mobile device of p i and computes 1 (a p ) , xpw * p = h 0 (u p ||pw * p )P, whence r p is available in the mobile device. E compares xpw * p and xpw p , the equality of these two values ensures the correctness of the guessed pw * p , else, E attempts with some other guess. In this way, the attacker E can guess the password of p i .
IV. CONCLUSION
Given any authentication scheme, if the secret key of the server is compromised and comes in the knowledge of an attacker then the scheme will surely be exposed to various types of attacks. In fact, leakage of server's secret key is very rare and this is a very strong assumption to apply attacks on an existing scheme. The reason is that the server is the most trusted authority in the scenario of authentication schemes, thereby; there are substantial security provisions to maintain the security of server's secret key.
We observed that Ostad-Sharif et al.'s scheme suffers from key compromise impersonation attack as well as key compromise password guessing attack although they would have definitely tried their best to avoid the possibility of key compromise attack on their scheme as they themselves mounted this attack on the target schemes in their work, and in the process of seeking a solution to this attack they designed and presented a new scheme. Thus, it is hardly possible for an authentication scheme to defy this attack. Moreover, once the secret key of the server comes in the knowledge of an attacker E, he/she can act as the legitimate server. In sensitive application scenario of healthcare, the attacker sitting as a valid server can collect sensitive data of patients that can be misused for various purposes. In addition, the attacker acting as the legitimate server can also provide false reply to patients' queries thereby creating problems in their treatment with an intention to corrupt the online healthcare system. Therefore, key compromise attack is detrimental for sensitive applications such as healthcare services and it may lead to public unrest and disinterest in online services.
Based on the above analysis and discussion we put forward two questions for the researchers working in this field. First question is whether the key compromise attack should be designated as a valid attack or an invalid attack. That is, researchers should provide either validity or invalidity to this attack. Second question is that if the researchers provide validity to this attack then they should provide a concrete solution to it which is an open challenge.
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